Engineering the Allocation of Public Resources
Unit 1: Foundations
- Session 1: Efficiency Lecture Slides
- Pareto Efficiency; Rank Efficiency; Serial Dictatorship; First Choices First
- Session 2: Incentives Lecture Slides
- Truthful; Individually Rational; the Core; Board Game “Math Trades”
- Session 3: TTC + Fairness Lecture Slides
- Top Trading Cycles; Random Mechanism; Symmetry
- Session 4: A Striking Equivalence Lecture Slides
- Random Serial Dictatorship; Top Trading Cycles from Random Endowments
- Session 5: Intro to School Choice
- First Choices First (Boston); Generalized Top Trading Cycles; Justified Envy; Respecting Priorities
- Session 6: The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
- School/Student Proposing Deferred Acceptance; Lone Wolf Theorem; Student Optimal Stable Match
- Session 7: Intro to Residency Matching
- Truthfulness of Deferred Acceptance; Unraveling; Stability
- Session 8: Matching with Couples
- Non-Existence of Stable Matching; Small Core;
- Session 9: Tiebreaking
- Weak Stability; Strong Stability; Single Tiebreaking; Multiple Tiebreaking
- Session 10: University Admissions + Midterm Study Guide
Unit 2: Diversity and Affirmative Action
- Session 11: Maximum Quotas
- Diversity Visa Lottery; Maximum Quota; Priority Domination; Nested;
- Session 12: Minimum Quotas
- Mechinot Gap Year Matching; Minimum Quota; Top Down Processing
- Session 13: Intro To Reserves
- H1B Visa Lottery; Minimum Guarantee; Over and Above; Sequential Lotteries
- Session 14: Affirmative Action in India
- Vertical Reservations; Horizontal Reservations; Overlapping Reservations
- Session 15: Chilean Constitutional Assembly
- Session 16: Affirmative Action in Brazil
- Session 17: Matching with Complex Preferences
- Substitutability; Law of Aggregate Demand; Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts; Generalized Deferred Acceptance (Cumulative Offers)
- Session 18: Matching with Contracts
- Kelso-Crawford; Cadet Branch Matching; University Admission with Financial Aid
Unit 3: Dynamic Matching